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INTRODUCTION
The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries are break-
ing up their centrally planned economies at a record pace by
selling formerly state-owned industrial enterprises to private
sector investors. Privatization is expected to create more profit-
oriented and efficient industries, a predicate for sustained long-
term economic growth. This transformation from public to pri-
vate ownership presents tremendous challenges to these new
democracies as they struggle to create market economies and
democratic institutions.
Among the most serious problems faced by the newly emerg-
ing economies in privatizing their industrial sectors is financing
the cleanup and disposal of the hazardous wastes generated by
these industries during the Cold War era.' The cost of cleaning
up these wastes has been estimated in the hundreds of billions
of dollars.' Who should bear the tremendous costs of this clean-
up?
The new national governments are the heirs apparent to this
environmental nightmare. Yet, their resources are hopelessly
inadequate to meet the pressing problems of high unemploy-
ment and social welfare, much less to finance the necessary
environmental cleanup measures. Furthermore, foreign aid, once
See, e.g., Shelley Bookspan, When the Smoke Clears: Environmental Restoration in Central
and Eastern Europe, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 407, 408 (1993) (stating that major issue is how to pay
for environmental restoration without repelling investors); Margaret Bowman & David
Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-Communist Central Europe: From High Hopes to Hard
Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 921, 966 (1992) (noting Western investors' concern over envi-
ronmental liability and cleanup standards in CEE countries); Julie Scott, Environmental
Liability and Privatization in Eastern Europe, EUR. ENrVTL. L. REV., June 1992, at 22, 22-23
(stating that difficult liability issues in CEE privatization are far from being resolved). See
generally, Ruth Greenspan Bell-& Thomas Adam Kolaja, Capital Privatization and the Manage-
ment of Environmental Liability Issues in Poland, 48 Bus. LAw. 943 (1993) (examining Polish
government attempts to manage environmental liability issues arising during privatization);
Elzbieta M. Zechenter, The Socio-Economic Transformation of Poland: Privatization and the Future
of Environmental Protection, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 99 (1993) (arguing that environ-
mental protection issues should be directly addressed in privatization process).
2 See, e.g., David R. Berz & Anne Margaret Connolly, The Economics of Cleaning Up the
Countries of the Eastern Bloc, RECORDER, Dec. 30, 1992 at 6 (estimating CEE cleanup costs in
hundreds of billions of dollars); D. H. Cole, Cleaning Up Krakow: Poland's Ecological Crisis
and the Political Economy of International Environmental Assistance, 2 COLO. J. INT'L EN rL. L. &
POL'Y 205, 234 (1991) (same); G. Nelson Smith Il, The Real Challenge to the Polish Revolution:
Cleaning the Polish Environment Through Privatization and Preventive Market-Based Incentives, 19
PEPP. L. RV. 553, 558 (1992) (same).
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believed to be readily available, has not been forthcoming for
environmental cleanup needs.' Pushing the costs of environmen-
tal cleanup onto the new private investors would present an
expedient way of addressing the CEE countries' environmental
problems.
Potential purchasers of state-owned companies in the CEE
countries do not want to shoulder the burden of financing the
cleanup of some of the most polluted areas in the world.4 Busi-
nesses already view investment in these new market economies
as a highly risky proposition. New investment would be likely to
disappear in any nation that attempted to shift the full burden
of cleaning up its environmental problems onto private inves-
tors.
Poland was the first of these newly emerging democracies to
face this issue when it began its privatization program in 1990.'
Many of its state-owned businesses produced tremendous quanti-
ties of pollutants and have serious hazardous waste cleanup
problems.6 Potential investors in these businesses quickly re-
' See Berz & Connolly, supra note 2, at 7-8 (surveying Western government appropria-
tions for environmental cleanup in CEE countries); see also Cole, supra note 2, at 236-37
(noting that, of approximately $9 billion of general economic assistance to Poland from
Western nations, only about $200 million is earmarked for environmental reclamation and
protection);.Smith, supra note 2, at 578-79, 587-88 (noting that, although various aid agen-
cies allocate money for environmental projects in CEE countries, these amounts fund only
small portion of total cleanup cost). See generally Barry Newman, Disappearing Act: West
Pledged Billions of Aid to Poland - Where Did It All Go, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1994, at A], A8
(explaining that much foreign aid to CEE countries is spent on Western consultants with
disappointing results).
' Joseph C. Bell, Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, in 14th ANNUAL INSTITUTE
FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL: DOING BUSINESS AND INESTING ABROAD 385 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 752, 1991) available in WESTLAW, 752 PLI/CORP
385, at *19; see also Michael Gruson & Georg F. Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the
Former German Democratic Republic: A Change of Direction, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1139, 1154
(1991) (stating that investors' fear of environmental liability in former East Germany is
major impediment to investment); Bowman & Hunter, supra note 1, at 966 (describing
investors' concerns over widespread industrial pollution in region).
' See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 1, at 967 (noting that Poland has arguably ad-
vanced furthest in its privatization process). Polish privatization of state-owned enterprises
involves strategic trade sales, initial public offerings, liquidation, mass privatization, restruc-
turing, and joint ventures. Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 944-45.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 558-65. Poland has been called the most polluted country
in the world. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 206. Environmental pollution and degradation
costs the Poles $3.4 billion per year, or roughly ten percent of their annual national in-
come. Smith, supra note 2, at 564; Cole, supra note 2, at 207.
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quested that the Polish government indemnify them against
potential environmental liability claims. They also asked the
government to set standards for future emissions. The Polish
government responded by devising stopgap policies for allocating
cleanup responsibilities and regulating ongoing pollution levels.
The measures that the Polish government has taken, including
creating escrow accounts to hold environmental cleanup funds
and limited indemnification agreements, leave investors uncer-
tain about their future liability for environmental problems. This
uncertainty is compounded by the lack of clear standards in
Polish law about permissible ongoing pollution levels.7 These
undefined and potentially escalating environmental liabilities
make private investors hesitant to undertake major investments
in privatization projects.
This paper uses auction theory to analyze the impact of exist-
ing pollution cleanup problems and of evolving liability rules on
the Polish government's privatization efforts.8 It begins with an
overview of the existing system for privatizing Polish companies
and an examination of Poland's environmental regulations. This
discussion concludes that Poland has not articulated its environ-
mental cleanup standards, leaving investors uncertain over their
potential liabilities.
The next three sections address what liability standards Poland
should adopt to accomplish its dual goals of maximizing state
revenues from the sale of its enterprises and financing the envi-
ronmental cleanup. Section II introduces the basic principles of
auction theory and the negative effects of uncertainty on auction
proceeds.
See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text (outlining Polish environmental regula-
tion). In addition, potential investors face considerable difficulty in determining which
agency is responsible for governmental enironmental liability policy. For example, even
though the Ministry of Privatization has primary responsibility for privatization, other agen-
cies and governmental units, such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the
Ministry of Justice, may control parts of the process for privatizing certain entities. Bell &
Kolaja, supra note 1, at 945. Furthermore, the divisions within the Ministry of Privatization
may each promote conflicting policies and goals. Id.
' In a forthcoming paper, Robert G. Hansen and I examine liability rules for future
pollution and the choice between strict liability and negligence standards for ongoing emis-
sions. See RANDALL S. THOMAS & ROBERT G. HANSEN, THE EFFICIENCY OF SHARING LIABILITY
FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE: THE EFFECrS OF UNCERTAINTY OVER DAMAGES (1994) (Tuck Busi-
ness School Working Paper).
University of California, Davis
These principles are then applied in Section III to compare
the Polish government's existing system of minimal pre-auction9
environmental audits with a more redundant comprehensive
environmental testing policy. This analysis shows that a more
extensive governmental testing system is preferable to the pres-
ent policy because it reduces the spread between the bidders'
value estimates for the companies being sold and thereby maxi-
mizes auction revenues. It also enables the Polish government to
identify the country's worst hazardous waste sites and target
them for priority cleanup.
Section IV contrasts the Polish system with the American and
German environmental liability regimes. It begins with an analy-
sis of the American CERC[A system of joint and several liability
and finds that this system also leaves investors uncertain about
the extent of their future environmental liabilities. Next, the
German approach for environmental liabilities of companies
based in former East Germany is examined." This system, if it
operates as the government intends, will greatly reduce investor
uncertainty, but will still have significant drawbacks.
Auction theory predicts that the uncertainty over environmen-
tal liabilities created by the Polish and American systems will
reduce the auction proceeds to the seller by more than the
expected value of these liabilities. In other words, uncertainty
about prospective environmental liabilities causes potential buy-
ers to lower their offering prices by more than the expected
' Given the difficulty in modeling the vast array of procedures used in selling Polish
companies, this paper assumes that Polish companies are sold through an auction process,
as is often the case.
" For example, the American system is based on a strict liability standard as set forth
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988) [hereafter CERCLA], as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereafter SARA]). CERCLA estab-
lishes joint and several, strict liability for damages caused by hazardous substances for cur-
rent and prior owners and operators of hazardous substance sites. See id.
" German law is intended to release investors in the new Eastern states from liability
for past environmental damage resulting from preexisting waste sites. The law was designed
to alleviate the fears of potential investors that they would acquire immeasurable environ-
mental risks. Under one provision, investors may apply for an exemption from liability.
However, the exemption does not represent a clear guarantee and leaves open a number
of difficult questions. See infra notes 81-116 and accompanying text (discussing German
environmental liability regime).
[Vol. 28:165
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costs of the environmental cleanup. As a result, both the Ameri-
can and Polish environmental liability schemes unnecessarily
reduce auction 'revenues.
The German system, while creating certainty that the level of
environmental liabilities will be zero, fails to generate any pri-
vate cleanup activity. Although a relatively wealthy country like
Germany can perhaps afford to make the large state-financed ex-
penditures necessary to clean up contaminated properties, Po-
land does not have the resources to support such a program.
Furthermore, adoption of the German system would place the
heavy burden of administering the entire national cleanup pro-
gram on the Polish government, a task that it is poorly
equipped to handle.
Instead of recommending either the German or American
models, this Article proposes a new hybrid environmental liabili-
ty regime for Poland. Under the proposed policy, developed
country and multinational aid agencies would be asked to pay
for the initial environmental audits for each state-owned enter-
prise. These agencies could finance environmental audits as part
of their programs to encourage foreign companies to invest in
Poland. In this way, aid donors could advance the dual objec-
tives of economic development and environmental cleanup at a
comparatively low cost and without undue governmental inter-
vention.
The Polish government would then negotiate with the win-
ning bidders in the auctions to pay a fixed amount of the clean-
up costs for the properties that they purchase, with the national
government financing any further needed cleanup. This policy
allows the state to negotiate flexibly over what portion of the
cleanup costs it will assess against a purchaser and what portion
it will absorb itself. This policy would be advantageous to Poland
and the private investors as it would maximize auction revenues
while also insuring that both the private and public sectors
would bear some of the costs of financing a cleanup of the
Polish environment.
This policy is subject to the criticism, however, that it does
not provide for the cleanup of existing, but unknown, hazardous
wastes that are not discovered in the environmental audit pro-
cess. One potential solution to this problem is to require win-
ning bidders to cover these excess environmental liabilities up to
University of California, Davis
a certain cost. Winning bidders could buy environmental liability
insurance (ELI), or self-insure if they conclude that they are
better off doing so. ELI could be sold by the private sector, the
Polish government, or one of the multinational aid agencies.
The Article concludes by examining whether an ELI scheme
would work. After describing the common features and prob-
lems of existing ELI plans, it analyzes which of three potential
sponsors would be best suited to create and run such an insur-
ance system. It finds that, at present, Poland lacks a private
sector with the capacity to issue insurance for excess environ-
mental cleanup costs. Furthermore, while the Polish government
could sell this insurance itself, it does not currently have the
administrative and technical skills needed to establish such a
program. Without question, multinational aid agencies are the
natural candidates to run an ELI program, particularly because
they could best spread its political and economic risks over a
larger pool of insured companies by developing a regional pro-
gram for all of the CEE countries. Nevertheless, such an ELI
program would be difficult to implement and costly to adminis-
ter. Thus, the Polish government may need to finance this por-
tion of the cleanup out of future tax revenues as a cost of en-
couraging greater private investment in Poland today.
I. POLISH PRIVATIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: AN
AD Hoc SYSTEM?
A. Overview of Privatization of Polish Enterprises'2
The Polish government uses a "sectoral approach" in
privatizing state-owned enterprises." To begin the privatization
" The following laws provide the legal basis for privatization in Poland: 23 Dec. 1988
Foreign Investment Law (Dz.U Nr 41, poz. 325); 13 July 1990 Act on Privatization of State
Owned Enterprises (Dz.U Nr 51, poz. 298) [hereafter Privatization Act], and 14 June 1991
Foreign Investment Law (Dz.U Nr 60, poz. 253). Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 944 n.5; see
alsoJerzy Rajski, Privatization in Poland, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
35, 35-53 (P. Sarcevic ed., 1992) (outlining Polish privatization process).
" The Ministry of Privatization introduced the sectoral approach in the summer of
1991. Bell & Kojala, supra note 1, at 946. This approach allows the Ministry to evaluate and
prepare for sale all enterprises categorized within the same general area of commerce. Id.
The sectoral approach helps to stop investors from merely purchasing the best company in
a given sector in order to establish a monopoly position in that area of commerce. Id.
The sectoral approach is not the only method of privatization in Poland. Businesses
[Vol. 28:165
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process, the Ministry' of Privatization chooses a commercial
sector in the Polish economy. The Ministry then
"commercializes" given enterprises within that sector by turning
those entities into joint stock or limited liability companies
which the Polish government treasury owns in their entirety. 4
A lead consultant, usually an investment bank or management
consulting firm, is chosen through a competitive tender process
to carry out the services needed for privatization. 5 These range
from conducting an analysis of the company to managing the
privatization."5 Following commercialization of the enterprise,
the lead consultant conducts a due diligence inquiry which
establishes a "working value" for the entity.'
To evaluate the potential environmental liabilities of each
company, the consultant (or its subcontractors) performs an
environmental audit. 8 No act or regulation specifies how these
environmental audits are to be conducted. But generally, the
environmental consultants visit the site, obtain background
information in order to determine if the company's premises
are contaminated, review company production history and com-
pliance with existing permits, and check current environmental
with a value of $10 million or less are privatized through a liquidation method that favors
domestic investors. Id. at 959. These transactions are not analyzed as closely as the larger
sectoral privatization. In fact, past liquidation transactions have entirely ignored
environmental liability and compliance because domestic investors are not accustomed to
considering issues such as environmental liability. Id. Instead, the Ministry merely asks
domestic investors to accept all liabilities as a condition of approving the transaction, and
the investors accept, perhaps due to their lack of understanding of the potential
consequences. Id. at 959-60.
SId. at 947. During this step, the Ministry of Privatization dissolves the entity's
"workers' council" and forms a supervisory board. The resulting enterprise assumes all
rights and responsibilities formerly held by the state-owned entity from which it arose. ld.
"5 In a competitive tender process, the Polish government solicits bids from firms and
determines the winner by evaluating various factors, including cost. See id. at 948-49
(describing Polish government procedure for selling state-owned businesses).
" Id. at 947. The consultant chooses subcontractors and other consultants to perform
environmental audits and to compile information which enables the Ministry of Privat-
ization to determine the best method for privatizing a given entity. Id.
" Id. The working value gives the government a valuation reference point, taking into
consideration financial, legal, and environmental valuation aspects. Id.
", Id. The Privatization Act requires that "an economic and financial study be prepared
for the purpose of asset valuation as well as establishing whether the implementation of
organizational, economic, or technical changes is required." Id. at 947-48 (quoting
Privatization Act, supra note 13, art. 20, para. 1); see also Bowman & L-anter, supra note 1,
at 967 (discussing process by which assessment reports are generated).
University of Calfornia, Davis
management practices. 9 Most importantly, however, these ini-
tial audits do not generally involve sampling of soil, air, or
water.20
Once the initial valuation and environmental studies are
completed, the company is ready for sale. The government has a
choice of three sale mechanisms: (1) auction; (2) a public stock
offering; or (3) negotiated sale following public invitation. l
Polish law requires the lead consultant to conduct a thorough
search for potential investors, but does not specify how the lead
consultant should solicit bids and what information it can
provide bidders.
As soon as a sufficiently large pool of potential investors has
been identified, they submit preliminary indications of interest
which are used to develop a short list of potential investors.
23
Investors on this short list are given access to the company and
its management to conduct their own due diligence
investigations. Upon completion of their due diligence investiga-
tions, those investors that remain interested submit bids for the
company. When choosing between bids, the Ministry of Privatiza-
tion considers several factors including: (1) the amount of cash
in the bid; (2) the investors' business plan for operating the
company; (3) the timing of the proposed investment; (4) the
impact of the investors' plans on workers; and (5) the investors'
willingness to negotiate to assume financial responsibility for
environmental liabilities. 4
The last factor, environmental liabilities, raises an important
concern. The costs of cleaning up past environmental damage
may be extensive and are legally the responsibili, of the state.
The Polish government, however, has relatively limited resources
'" Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 948.
Id. The prospective purchasers pay for this initial audit and all other pre-privat-
ization environmental investigations. Id. The initial audits are, however, rather superficial
and relatively inexpensive. Id.
21 Id. at 948 n.22 (citing Privatization Act, supra note 13, at art. 23).
I ld. at 948.
2' Id. at 949.
2 Id. The government gives greatest weight to the cash payment and the investors'
plan for improving the entity. Id. However, if offers are approximately the same, the last
three factors may be determinative. Id. But see Bowman & Hunter, supra note 1, at 966
(noting that lack of credit, political and social uncertainties, economic chaos, and lack of
hard currency return guarantees may be more important factors).
[Vol. 28:165
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to commit to such cleanups. The government knows that
potential investors will be discouraged if they are uncertain over
where responsibilities for environmental contamination will fall.
Despite this serious problem, the government has not
systematically addressed this issue.
When choosing among bids, the government considers how
potential investors propose to handle environmental damage,
and specifically, which investors will assume some responsibility
for environmental cleanup. After evaluating the bids, the
government presents a final decision to the Minister of Privat-
ization, who must approve the transaction. The parties then
prepare a sale document that includes the conditions of the
contractual negotiations as well as surrounding environmental
commitments. 5
B. Polish Environmental Regulation
The Polish regulatory scheme divides mnvironmental
regulation into three categories: (1) current discharges by
operating enterprises; (2) past on-site pollution; and (3) past
pollution that has either migrated into surrounding areas or
could do so.2 6 For existing on-site contamination, the investor
has legal responsibility under most circumstances, although the
Polish government has not specified cleanup standards.
Uncertainty about what Polish environmental standards require
creates a major problem. The problem is that without knowing
the level of contamination and the cost of cleanup for a given
site, it is very difficult to prepare a bid. Participants in this
process have assumed that cleanup standards are unlikely to be
stricter than the strictest Western European standards.28
' Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 951. The sale document also delineates all the as-
sumptions that the two sides made in proceeding with the bargaining. The "heads of
agreement" contain standard sales language, such as warranties, and a stipulation that the
Ministry has authority to sell the entity. Id. The contract also includes any agreements
associated with environmental issues and attachments, including the legal analysis the
government performed during the due diligence effort. Id.
' Id. For an overview of Polish environmental regulations, see Bowman & Hunter,
supra note 1, at 930-37.
" Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 952-53. However, agreements to date between inves-
tors and the Polish government have not required investors to clean up existing con-
tamination. Id.
' Smith, supra note 2, at 571. The rationale for using European Community (EC)
University of California, Davis
However, investors have been unable to obtain accurate cost
estimates because of the complex administrative structure used
in defining the scope of Polish environmental regulations, and
the potentially broad scope of Polish environmental law.29
The first step in defining an investor's potential liability for
existing on-site contamination is to conduct an -nvironmental
audit. The scope of the initial environmental audit, and the
rules for estimating the cost of cleanup, are negotiated between
the Ministry of Privatization and the lead consultant."0 At this
point, the government selects an environmental consultant who
will conduct the environmental audit under the supervision of
the Ministry of Privatization."1 The Ministry tells the consultant
what testing is required, what kind of analysis should be done,
and what cleanup standard to use as a point of reference for
cost estimates.3 2 Investors may later perform an additional,
more detailed site examination.3
Once the environmental audit is completed, the Ministry of
Privatization negotiates the cleanup obligations with each
individual investor.3 4 The principal technique for paying for
environmental cleanup is to set a portion of the company's
purchase price aside in a restricted escrow account that must be
used within a specified time period for cleanup activities.3" The
standards is that all of the CEE countries, including Poland, aspire to join the EC. Id. Thus,
they try to adopt pollution standards that are consistent with existing European standards.
Id.; Bowman & Hunter, supra note 1, at 970.
' Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 953. For example, the Polish Environmental
Protection Act authorizes a regional district government environmental inspectorate to
require that a site be returned to its "proper state." Id. (citing 31 Jan. 1980 Act on Pro-
tection and Shaping of the Environment (Dz.U Nr 3, poz. 6, art. 82)).
Currently, no regulations, guidelines, or interpretations define the proper state
standard. Potentially, however, this standard could justify a very stringent environmental
liability regime. Further complicating the matter is the possibility that the 49 district
government inspectors may interpret the proper state standard differently. Id.
'o Id.
31 Id.
" Id. The reference standard, which is often based on Dutch or German standards,
helps develop a common understanding between the investor and the government about
potential cleanup costs. Id. However, the actual standards used in managing the cleanup it-
self have not yet been established. Id. at 953 n.27.
" Id. at 953. In this second, more in-depth examination, the investor may direct the
auditor to collect soil or water samples. Id. at 953-54.
's Id. at 953. To date, no contractual agreement has established a standard which a giv-
en investor must meet when performing the actual cleanup. Id. at 955.
"5 Id. at 954. The Ministry of Privatization will not agree to an escrow account arrange-
[Vol. 28:165
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investor's potential liability for environmental cleanups is capped
at the amount placed in the escrow account. Investors may only
use such escrow funds for cleanup of past contamination
identified in the due diligence analysis, or for past
contamination identified during the time period of the escrow
account. 6 Escrow accounts allow the government to provide
funds to pay for site cleanup while also defining and limiting
the total amount of money to be applied to remediation 7
Although most investors accept these escrow arrangements,
many request governmental indemnification against any
additional responsibility for environmental cleanup. The Ministry
has been willing to grant indemnity only on rare occasions, for
a limited duration, and for relatively small amounts."
ment if the responsible parties have not yet performed a site assessment and if no factual
basis for evaluating the extent of environmental liability exists. Id.
3" Id. at 957. Escrow agreements do not allow investors to use the funds for process-re-
lated investments or to address future contamination. Sometimes, the Ministry requires
investors to make matching contributions each time they draw from the accounts. This
matching amount is negotiated as part of the transaction agreement and is generally used
to provide an incentive for investors to use the most cost-effective cleanup practices. The
government may also restrict such escrow accounts by requiring investors to: (1) secure
cleanup activities through competitive tenders; and (2) invite Polish firms to bid in such
tenders. Id. at 958.
Managing escrow accounts is problematic because the government has not established
account management procedures. The Ministry of Privatization attempted to require that
the accounts be held in domestic banks. However, Polish banks are inexperienced in man-
aging such accounts, there are a limited number of qualified accountants and financial
managers, and the Ministry itself does not have the ability to track accounts. Investors must
therefore arrange for escrow account management. Id. at 958-59.
I d. at 958. The government has used escrow accounts to resolve issues that otherwise
might have impeded transactions. In structuring escrow accounts, the Ministry has sought
to give investors an incentive to pursue cost-effective and timely cleanups. Under such
escrow agreements, the government requires that remediation activities begin within twelve
months of the date of sale or else all funds will revert to the treasury. Id.
" Id. at 954. To date, the government has granted indemnity only where the audit has
indicated little basis for concern and where indemnification appeared to facilitate the
transaction. Id. As with escrow accounts, the government will not grant indemnity without a
site assessment. Id. The Ministry has also rejected requests for indemnity against potential
enforcement actions for future violations. Id. at 955 n.29. Investors often seek indemnity in
circumstances in which an entity may bring an enforcement action against them or in
which a third party may enter a claim against them. Id. at 954. When calculating the
potential amount of liability, the government assumes that Polish law will establish the
required cleanup standard. Id. The government also assumes that Polish standards will be
less stringent than other potential standards. Id. at 953 n.28, 954; see also Bowman &
Hunter, supra note 1, at 967 (stating Poland's general policy not to fully indemnify
purchasers for environmental liability).
University of Calfornia, Davis
Cleanup standards are established only when the actual
cleanup begins. 9 With no clear Polish policy on the matter, the
government looks to other nations' standards as well as the
identity of the particular investor when setting the actual
guidelines. Thus, the government tends to use different
standards for each transaction. As a result, most investors assume
strict standards when they estimate cleanup costs.'
Investors are also concerned about potential liability for past
pollution that has caused off-site damage. The Ministry of Pri-
vatization has addressed these concerns by offering time-limited
indemnity against third-party claims.4 To qualify for indemnity,
an investor must show that the environmental damage is causally
linked to the state's operation of the facility, or that it occurred
before the end of the remediation period.
Under current government policy in Poland, investors are
responsible for controlling current emissions from their
facilities." In principle, this gives the investor a strong incentive
to implement a cost effective program to bring the facility into
compliance with environmental requirements. However, the
Polish government makes it difficult for investors to determine
what they need to do to comply with environmental regulations.
At a minimum, the investor can establish a baseline level of
allowable pollution emissions by referring to the initial
environmental audit. Frequently, the investor will also perform a
follow-up audit. Beyond this point though, Polish law is vague.
The Ministry of Privatization requires investors to work out
environmental compliance agreements with all of the necessary
governmental units.43  Given the Polish government's
administrative structure, this is difficult for investors."
" Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 955. When negotiating, the parties only make assump-
tions about cleanup standards to estimate cleanup costs. Id.
' ld. at 955 n.30. As a result of uncertain cleanup standards in Polish law, the level of
intensity with which investors approach site cleanup will be driven by concerns about
unknown levels of liability rather than by an intention to comply with well-defined
standards. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing effect of uncertainty on
auction proceeds).
"' Id at 957.
42 Id. at 952. The Ministry of Privatization has rejected proposals to make the govern-
ment, rather than the investor, responsible for bringing the enterprise into compliance
with environmental standards. Id.
4. Id.
" This difficulty arises because, while the privatization process is overseen centrally
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Investors formulate bids based on their estimates of the value
of the companies being sold and the liabilities associated with
them. Potential bidders are wary of purchasing companies with
significant hazardous waste cleanup problems because of the un-
certainty surrounding the cleanup costs. If they knew what these
costs would be, these bidders could build them into their
calculations of the company's value and bid accordingly.
However, if bidders are uncertain about the amount of their
potential liability, they may choose not to bid, or to drastically
lower their bids. The next Section explores the effect of
uncertainty over environmental liabilities on the sale of Polish
companies.
II. UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES ARTIFICIALLY.
DEPRESS AUCTION REVENUES
Auctioning Polish companies accomplishes two important
objectives for the Polish government: it allocates companies to
the users who value them most and it maximizes revenue for
the Polish government. Environmental liabilities will reduce
auction revenues because rational bidders will reduce their bids
by the amount of their expected cleanup costs. Thus, the reve-
nue that the Polish government receives from the sale of the
state-owned enterprises can be thought of as: (1) the expected
value of the company without environmental liabilities; (2) mi-
nus the winning bidder's expected environmental cleanup costs.
The uncertainty surrounding the second component, the expect-
ed cost of environmental liabilities, is the key to analyzing the
effects of different environmental liability regimes.
Uncertainty about environmental liabilities reduces auction
revenues disproportionately to the actual cost of the liabilities.
To illustrate the effects of this uncertainty on auction revenues,
this Article first looks at how uncertainty impacts auction reve-
nues in a common-value auction.45 It assumes that for any com-
from Warsaw, the forty-nine district governments of Poland are responsible for granting
and enforcing permits. Id.
"' In order to discuss the effects of uncertainty on auctions, it is easiest to deal with a
common-value model. Auction theory currently includes two polar models: the common-
value model and the independent private values model. In the former, the value of the
item being sold is uncertain but is the same to all bidders; in the latter, each bidder knows
180 University of Cal fornia, Davis [Vol. 28:165
pany being auctioned, all potential private investors are equally
capable of operating the enterprise should they win the auction.
This assumption facilitates the analysis but. is not critical to the
results.
To model the price that the Polish government will receive
for any enterprise that it sells, some terminology must be de-
fined. Let E(v) equal the expected value of the company being
sold. Assume that v, the true value of the company, will only be
known ex post, so that there will be uncertainty over the value
of v ex ante. Given these assumptions, common-value auction
theory states that E(p) < E(v), where E(p) is the expected price in
the auction.46 In other words, uncertainty reduces the expected
price in the auction below the expected value of the company
being sold.
There are two related explanations for this result. The first
derives from the "winner's curse" phenomenon.47 The winner's
curse in a common-value auction refers to the frequently ob-
served fact that the winning bidder will generally be the bidder
who thinks the item for sale is worth the most. The winning
bidders will have value estimates that tend to be biased high,
leading them to overestimate the value of the item.48 Rational
bidders recognize that auctions select the highest-valued bidder,
and therefore they bid lower in the auction to compensate for
this bias. This insures that if they win the auction, they do not
suffer the winner's curse. This leads to lower bidding by all
the value of the item to himself but each bidder's value will be different (hence the term
"independent private values"). Most real auctions will have both common-value and inde-
pendent private value characteristics. A model that deals with such auctions has been devel-
oped. See Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,
50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982). But such a model is considerably more complex than a
simple common-value model. Adopting Milgrom and Weber's model would not change any
of this Article's conclusions.
46 See Douglas K. Reece, Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9 BELI.J. ECON.
369, 380 (1978) (formally proving relationship between E(p) and E(v)).
47 The winner's curse has also been raised as a possible explanation for bidder overpay-
ment for takeover targets. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J.
Bus. 197, 197-200 (1986); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price,
Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1274 (1990).
48 For any given amount of information that a bidder possesses, its value estimate for
the item being sold will be defined as the average value that the bidder estimates the item
to have.
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bidders, thereby putting downward pressure on auction prices.
As a result, E(p) < E(v).
Uncertainty over the true value of the item being sold is the
second explanation for this result. Where there is uncertainty
over an item's true value, bidders will arrive at different esti-
mates of its expected value. A bidder will therefore have an
incentive to bid low, knowing it is highly likely that the next-
highest bidder's value estimate will be significantly lower. The
size of the difference between bidders' value estimates deter-
mines how much profit-maximizing bidders will bid beneath
their true value estimates.
The differences between bidders' value estimates will be larger
as the variation of their value estimates increases. Bids will be
relatively close to value estimates when the differences between
value estimates are small because the highest-valued bidder
wants to top the next-highest bidder and win the auction. How-
,ever, when the differences in bidders' value estimates are large,
the bidders can strategically reduce their bids by a significant
amount because there is little risk of losing to the next-highest
bidder.
Several economists have explored the effects of uncertainty on
auction revenues in the sale of public offshore oil drilling leas-
es.49 They find significant adjustments in bidder behavior to
take into account the winner's curse and uncertainty over the
value of the leases being sold. These adjustments result in high-
er profits for the bidder and lower auction revenues for the
seller.
In short, uncertainty over the value of the companies being
sold means that the Polish government will not obtain a price
equal to the true value of the company via an auction. The
winning bidder expects to profit by participating in auctions,
4 See, e.g., Otis W. Gilley & Gordon V. Karels, The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding:
New Evidence, 12 BELLJ. ECON. 637 (1981)(reconciling differences between bidding theory
models and empirical studies); Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study
of an Auction With Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865 (1988) (finding firms on
neighboring tracts have advantage of better information and use it when bidding against
non-neighbors).
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and thus to obtain a slice of this value. The transaction cost"
of using an auction is the difference E(v) - E(p).
These costs must be balanced against the benefits of auctions.
Let E(s) equal the expected value of the company under the
current ownership, and recall that v is the true ex post value of
the company. In other words, v is the value of the company
once it is being operated by new management after the auction.
In that case E(v) > E(s), for s will be less than v if private owners
value the company more than the state does - a fundamental
assumption that underlies the Polish efforts to privatize.
The more important question is whether E(s) exceeds E(p). In
other words, is the price that the Polish government receives in
the auction greater than the value of the company as a state-
owned enterprise? Unfortunately, theory alone does not answer
this question.
To address this problem, we must look more closely at the
effects of uncertainty about environmental liabilities on auction
prices. Auction theory states that a seller can maximize the ex-
pected proceeds from the auction by reducing bidder uncertain-
ty. Stated differently, as bidders' uncertainty over the item's
value decreases, E(p) increases.5
Uncertainty surrounding a company's environmental cleanup
liabilities could be reduced in two ways: first, by undertaking
more extensive pre-auction testing to determine the level of.
existing pollution; and second, by fixing the size and scope of
investors' cleanup responsibilities. This Article addresses each of
these methods below.
o Transaction costs in this context can be thought of as the full cost of selling the
company, including the buyer's expected profit.
"' See Milgrom & Weber, supra note 45, at 1102 (formally proving relationship between
bidder uncertainty and E(p)); see also R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and
Bidding, 25J. ECON. LITERATURE 699, 722 (1987) (restating relationship between bidder un-
certainty and E(p)).
In its most extreme form, uncertainty over environmental liability could lead bidders
to reduce their valuations of the companies being sold to below zero. This would lead
bidders to choose not to participate in the auction. Reducing the number of bidders in the
auction would result in lower auction prices. Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick,
Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and The Process of Competition, 57J. Bus. 417, 439 (1984). This is par-
ticularly likely to be the case with "negative asset enterprises," that is, those companies
whose environmental liabilities exceed their market value. See Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at
958.
[Vol. 28:165
1994] The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on Privatization 183
III. IMPROVING PRE-AUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING
INCREASES AUCTION REVENUES
One source of uncertainty about the value of the Polish com-
panies being auctioned is that the bidders do not know the
extent of on-site pollution. Under the existing Polish system, the
only pre-auction information bidders receive about environmen-
tal contamination is the initial environmental audit conducted
under the supervision of the Ministry of Privatization. However,
this audit is a low-cost, preliminary survey paid for by the com-
pany being sold. 2 It serves only to approximate the upper limit
of environmental cleanup costs for transactional purposes.
Potential investors could undertake their own follow-up investi-
gation by commissioning a more in-depth examination of the
site.53 This would permit them to collect soil, air, and water
samples or to look more closely at specific pollution problems.
Unfortunately, these studies are very expensive.5 4 A potential
bidder is unlikely to decide to undertake such a study unless the
company being sold is large and very attractive.
Potential bidders' uncertainty about the environmental liabili-
ties of these companies can be reduced by providing more com-
plete pre-auction information about the scope of the environ-
mental cleanup problem. This will have the effect of decreasing
the difference between E(p) and E(v).5" To illustrate this point,
suppose there is a sealed-bid auction where n bidders are con-
tending to purchase a Polish company of uncertain value. Con-
sider two possible scenarios. In the first case, assume that all
bidders have identical information about the company's value.
This implies that all bidders have the same expected value, E(v),
for the company.
Given these assumptions, a rational bidding strategy is for all
bidders to submit a bid of E(v).56 Even though this bid leaves
52 Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 948.
"' See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing possible steps in follow-up in-
vestigations).
' Jonathan R. Nash, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability Of Haz-
ardous Waste Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455, 492 n.261 (1992) (stating that in Unit-
ed States, companies selling environmental liability insurance require Superfund site in-
spections that may take up to two years to complete and cost an average of $850,000).
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
This strategy will result in a "Nash equilibrium," where the bidders have no incentive
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bidders with no expected profit, any bidder that unilaterally
deviates from this strategy will either win for sure but at a loss,
or lose with equal certainty. Thus, if the Polish government can
insure that each bidder has identical information, it will obtain
the company's expected value through an auction.
On the other hand, what happens if bidders have different
value estimates? In this second scenario, suppose that the
bidders' value estimates are viewed as independent draws from a
probability distribution the mean of which equals the item's true
value. In an equilibrium, bidders will generally find it optimal to
bid less than their estimated values. This means that the Polish
government will receive less than the company's expected value.
This illustrates how uncertainty and heterogeneous information
leads bidders to reduce their bids strategically: By lowering their
bids below their estimated value, the bidders will be reducing
their probability of winning by less than one.
To raise auction prices, the Polish government needs to in-
sure that all bidders have similar value estimates. Making
bidders' information more homogeneous decreases the differ-
ence between E(p) and E(v). Giving all bidders common perti-
nent information, such as an appraiser's value estimates of a
company, is a favored technique for reducing information dis-
parities. This common information gives all bidders a similar
basis for estimating the value of these corporate assets. This
important relationship between information and expected selling
prices can be stated as follows. Assume we have an auction of a
company with value v, which is the same for all bidders, where v
is unknown ex ante to the bidders but the bidders have value
estimates which are identically and independently distributed ac-
cording to a probability function F(v). In this situation, if all
bidders follow Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, providing
additional information to all bidders concerning the item's value
will increase the expected selling price.57
to switch to different bids, given that other bidders do not deviate from this strategy. ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUcTION To GAME THEORY 33 (1989). The
equilibrium in the text is a weak Nash equilibrium in that there are other bids besides E(v)
that give bidders the same expected profit (which is zero). Of course, if all bidders were to
bid something other than E(v), there would be an incentive for any one bidder to change
his strategy.
- See Milgrom & Weber, supra note 45, at 1102-03 (proving relationship between infor-
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This relationship implies that the Polish government could
maximize its auction revenues by providing all bidders with
information about the scope of environmental liabilities faced by
the companies it is selling." The better this information is, the
more likely that potential bidders will have the same value esti-
mates and the lower the gap will be between E(p) and E(v).
Unfortunately, these environmental audits are expensive and
Poland lacks the resources to undertake them at present. One
possible solution to this problem is to ask developed country
and multinational aid agencies to pay for the initial environmen-
tal audits for each state-owned enterprise. These agencies could
finance environmental audits as part of their programs to en-
courage companies to invest in Poland. In this way, aid donors
could advance the dual objectives of economic development and
environmental cleanup at a comparatively low cost and without
undue governmental intervention.
Some countries, such as the United States, encourage their
domestic businesses to invest in the CEE countries by subsidizing
the companies' investigation of these markets. For example, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides pre-
investment services to U.S. investors exploring the feasibility of
investing in the CEE countries. Under existing programs, OPIC
will award grants of up to $150,000, or 50% of the costs of a
feasibility study of a CEE market, to an eligible American
investor.59 The U.S. could easily adopt programs like OPIC's to
cover the costs of environmental audits of Polish companies that
American investors are considering buying. This would help the
Polish government and further American objectives of increasing
American investment in the CEE countries.
mation and expected selling prices); McAfee & McMillan, supra note 51, at 722 (restating
relationship between information and expected selling prices); see also Bruce A. Markell,
Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REX'. 69, 110-
11 (1991) (applying this result in bankruptcy context).
' See Smith, supra note 2, at 574-75 (arguing that CEE countries should institute pro-
gram of environmental audits so that they can identify environmental problems, take full
advantage of available Western cleanup technology, provide investors with information con-
cerning environmental problems, and reduce investors' concerns about environmental
liabilities).
" See OPIC Commits $6 Million For CIS Business Studies, WORLD ENV. REP. Aug. 20, 1993,
at 132-33.
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Instituting a strong system of environmental audits would also
achieve an important environmental objective: identifying the
worst hazardous waste sites for priority cleanup. Given the Polish
government's lack of resources to finance environmental clean-
ups, it must decide which sites to handle first. Without environ-
mental audits, the government cannot know where to target its
cleanups.
IV. How Do DIFFERENT LIABILITY REGIMES AFFECT AUCTION
REVENUES?
Even the best pre-auction environmental audit is of limited
value to potential bidders if they cannot estimate their cleanup
costs. To determine their cleanup costs, investors need to know
two things. First, what level of cleanup is required? In other
words, what environmental quality standards should they achieve,
with what technology, and within what time frame? Second, what
portion of these costs are they legally responsible for? Unfortu-
nately, the Polish government has yet to address either issue.
The first question, while critical for developing cost estimates,
is a policy issue that lies largely beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.' However, one point is apparent: to reduce investor uncer-
tainty, Poland should determine what level of cleanup it will
require and make that clear to investors. Because of the
government's ambiguous policy, investors have assumed that
cleanup standards will be no harsher than the toughest Western
European standards.6' If investors believe they will have to meet
Western European environmental standards, and Poland subse-
quently adopts laxer standards, auction revenues will be need-
lessly reduced by overestimates of potential environmental liabili-
ties. Clearly, the Polish government would reduce the level of
' To answer this question, policymakers will need to make some hard choices between
low cost technologies that contain pollution and higher cost measures that cleanup pollu-
tion. For example, toxic waste sites can be excavated and incinerated if high cost cleanup
technology is used. Alternatively, a cheaper impermeable w-all could be built around the
toxic waste site to contain the problem and reduce human health risks. See Scott, supra
note 1, at 23 (comparing costs of complete cleanup with costs of containment). The re-
mainder of this Article assumes that the Polish government has determined the appropri-
ate technological solution.
"' Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 953.
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uncertainty surrounding environmental liabilities by defining its
cleanup standards.
As the seller of these companies, the Polish government wants
to adopt a legal standard that maximizes auction revenues while
still financing the cleanup of the existing hazardous waste sites.
From the auctioneer's perspective, the existing Polish law is the
worst of all worlds. Investors are operating in a country that has
not yet formulated unambiguous legal standards for environmen-
tal cleanup.62 This leaves them uncertain about the appropriate
level of cleanup responsibilities.
Two alternative legal regimes for Poland are considered here:
a strict liability regime similar to that adopted in the United
States, and a "no liability" policy like Germany's. Each of these
policies has different effects on the revenues that the govern-
ment realizes from the sale of state-owned industries.
A. The United States: Strict Liability Under CERCLA
In 1980, the United States Congress enacted CERCLA
expressly "(1) to provide for cleanup if a hazardous substance is
released into the environment or if such release is threatened,
and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these
cleanups."6" CERCLA authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to remove, or cause the removal of, any
hazardous contaminant whenever there is a release or a "sub-
62Id.
Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Cor-
porate Law'Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 267-68 (1992) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 253 (lII),
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038); Michael D.
Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability and an Alternative
Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 897 (1993) (comparing successor liability under CERCLA with
products liability claims); see also SARA, supra note 11 (amending CERCLA).
CERCLA was designed to address what Congress considered to be deficiencies in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1992) [hereafter RCRA].
Green, supra, at 900-01. RCRA was previously the primary statute addressing hazardous
wastes. Oswald & Schipani, supra, at 264 n.20. RCRA was created, among other things, to
stop open dumping and to encourage the cleanup of existing open dumps. RCRA's pri-
mary shortcoming proved to be the fact that it applies to hazardous waste problems created
by current and future production and storage activities, but only applies to past acts where
the contaminated site currently poses an "imminent hazard." Green, supra, at 900-01. RCRA
"is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that the)' are posing an imminent
hazard." Oswald & Schipani, supra, at 264 n.21 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).
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stantial threat of release" of any contaminant "which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health
or welfare."" CERCLA also created a "Superfund," or
Hazardous Substance Fund, that Congress intended the EPA to
use to study and cleanup contaminated sites, to recover costs of
cleanups from responsible parties, and to order such parties to
take remedial action.65
CERCLA is retroactive and imposes strict liability on
responsible parties.' It does not contain any express provisions.
for successor corporation liability67 but does hold past and
present owners and operators of vessels or facilities strictly liable
for costs associated with cleaning up contaminated sites.' Thus,
in a sense, CERCLA contains its own successor liability provision
because it makes past and present owners liable for cleanup
costs.69 An asset purchaser that buys assets that include a haz-
ardous substance site is therefore liable under the express
provisions of CERCLA.
Successor liability remains important in determining how
these cleanup costs are allocated.7" If there were no CERCLA
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1992).
Lorelei Joy Borland, Environmental Statutes Which May Impact Business Transactions, in
THE IMPACr OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1990 (PLI Corp.
L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, Dec. 1990 - Mar. 1991), available in WESTLAW, 716
PLI/CORP. 9, at *3; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 63, at 265 n.29 (describing
CERCLA attempts to rectify earlier regulatory weaknesses).
r6 GAIL S. PORT, CERCLA LITIGATION & LIABILITY UPDATE 1 (1992); Green, supra note
63, at 901. In addition, CERCLA § 9607 makes four statutorily defined classes of persons
jointly and severally liable for hazardous substance release response costs: (1) current
owners and operators of the facility; (2) former owners and operators, but only for releases
occurring during their ownership or operation; (3) "persons who arranged for the disposal
of hazardous substances," and; (4) "transporters of hazardous substances who also selected
the disposal site." Allen Kezsbom et al., "Successor" and "Parent" Liability for Superfund
Cleanup Costs: The Evolving State of the Law, 10 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 45, 45 n.2 (1990) (restating
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1992)); see also Port, supra, at 1; Oswald & Schipani, supra note
63, at 268-69 (discussing CERCLA § 9607).
67 Kezsbom, supra note 66, at 45.
6' Green, supra note 63, at 903; see supra note 66 and accompanying text (outlining
classes of persons subject to joint and several CERCLA liability).
' See Green, supra note 63, at 904 n.43 (listing commentators who have noted
CERCLA contains successor liability provision because it makes past and present owners lia-
ble for cleanup costs).
" Id. at 904. Green gives an example where hazardous substances have been disposed
of on a site over a twenty year period. During the first ten years, A owned the site. A then
sold all of its assets, including the site, to B at the end of year ten. B operated the site for
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successor liability, a company purchasing the assets of a
predecessor corporation would be liable only for the cleanup
costs for hazardous substances disposed of on the site during
the period in which the successor company owned the site. The
net effect of CERCLA successor liability is to make the successor
corporation liable for the cleanup costs of substances disposed
of on the site prior to the time that the successor company
purchased the site.7
The American courts have held successor corporations, and
not the taxpayer, responsible for cleaning up contaminated sites,
relying on the legislative history of the statute and the intent of
Congress in creating CERCLA.7" For example, in the leading
case, Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., " the
Third Circuit stated that "Congressional intent supports the con-
clusion that, when choosing between the taxpayers or a
successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost ....
We believe it in line with the thrust of the legislation to permit
- if not require - successor liability under traditional concepts.
the next ten years of disposal. CERCLA makes B liable for the cleanup of the second ten
years of waste as an owner of the site. B will be liable, however, for the first ten years of
waste only if it is liable as a successor in interest to A. See id.
71 Id.
7 Kezsbom, supra note 66, at 46.
7' 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); see also, Green, supra
note 63 at 907-08 (explaining Celotex holding).
74 Celotex, 851 F.2d at 92. Commentators have vigorously debated whether CERCLA has
caused the courts to stretch the traditional frontier of corporate law doctrine. See, e.g.,
Green, supra note 63 at 908-13 (contrasting successor liability in products liability cases with
successor liability under CERCLA); Daniel H. Squire et al., Corporate Successor Liability Under
CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43 Sw. L.J. 887 (1990) (examining extent to which courts will hold
corporate successors jointly and severally liable for their predecessors' polluting activities);
Tom McMahon & Kate Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in Envi-
ronmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1988) (arguing that courts have eroded tra-
ditional corporate law protections of shareholders and successor corporations under
CERCLA); Todd W. Rallison, Comment. The Threat to Investment in the Hazardous Waste
Industry: An Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 1987
UTAH L. REV. 585 (discussing corporate and individual shareholders' potential liability for
CERCLA cleanup costs). Some commentators have argued that under CERCLA, the courts
may impose liability based on a party's mere status as a corporate officer, shareholder, or
parent corporation without regard to the nature of the person's actions or involvement.
Oswald & Schipani, supra note 63, at 260-61. Other scholars have argued, however, that
CERC[A does not expand traditional corporate law doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 260-61 (arguing
that active involvement in violation by corporate party is still prerequisite to finding liability
under CERCLA).
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A variety of arguments have been advanced in favor of strict
successor liability under CERCLA.75  Only one of these
arguments deserves serious discussion: corporate successor
liability under CERCLA serves as a conduit to transfer the
liability for the proper disposal and cleanup of hazardous sub-
stance sites to the predecessor company at the time of the asset
purchase because future buyers will discount the price that they
pay for these assets to take into consideration these CERCLA
costs.76 In this manner, predecessor corporations will be forced
to assume the real costs of their acts and internalize these
externalities.77
CERCLA's strict liability will be economically efficient if a
purchaser can accurately calculate these potential disposal and
cleanup costs. If a firm value for these costs can be calculated,
then the prospective purchaser will simply deduct those costs
from its bid for the predecessor entity, and the owners of the
predecessor entity will bear the full costs of their previous
activities. However, even if potential purchasers carefully
investigate the potential liabilities of the predecessor entity, their
research may fail to uncover or accurately determine the extent
of the potential environmental liabilities. In these circumstances,
purchasers will have to decide whether to purchase the
predecessor entity even though they are uncertain about the
true extent of these liabilities.
This uncertainty is partially alleviated by CERCLA's innocent
purchaser defense.78 This defense excuses a prudent purchaser
of property from cleanup liability if "[a]t the time the defendant
7" See Green, supra note 63, at 908-18 (arguing that only legitimate justification for
successor liability is to funnel liability back to responsible entity).
'6 See id. at 906, 913-18 (arguing that successor liability forces predecessor corporations
to assume cleanup costs by reducing asset purchase prices paid by successors).
71 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, OPTIMAL CLEANUP AND LI ILITY
AFrER ENxqRONMENTAI.I.Y HARMFUL DISCHARGES, (Harvard Law and Economics Program
Working Paper No. 99, September 1992) (concluding that making firms responsible for
cleanup and strictly liable for any remaining harm will lead to socially optimal outcome).
"' See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 63, at 267. This defense is codified at 42 U.S.C. §
9601(35)(A)-(B) (1992). CERCLA also incorporates specific statutory defenses that a
defendant may use to avoid liability. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 63, at 266. A party may
avoid liability under CERCLA where the damages occurred due to an act of God, an act of
war, an act or omission of a third party not related directly or indirectly to the defendant,
or any combination of these actions, or where a federally permitted release caused the
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1992).
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acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on,
in, or at the facility. " '
In order to establish that the purchaser had no reason to
know of the release or threatened release of the hazardous sub-
stance, CERCLA requires that "the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent
with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability."8' This defense permits acquiring cor-
porations to safeguard themselves from future liabilities for
unknown environmental problems by taking reasonable
precautions to uncover prospective problems before purchasing
another company.
Unfortunately, the validity of a successor company's "innocent
purchaser" defense can only be established after it has
purchased the predecessor company and after an environmental
cleanup problem has been uncovered. Faced with an unsafe
environmental condition, courts may be tempted in hindsight to
find that a successor company failed to exercise due care and
should be liable for cleaning up any waste problem. This sharply
curtails the usefulness of this defense as a method of reducing a
purchaser's uncertainty about the extent of its potential
CERCLA liabilities. Thus, under current American law, most
purchasers of potentially contaminated sites will face uncertainty
about their future CERCLA liabilities.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (i) (1992).
'o 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (B) (1992). To determine whether a purchaser "had no reason
to know," the statute directs courts to consider: 1) any specialized knowledge or experience
of the defendant; 2) the relationship of the property's purchase price to the value it would
have had if not contaminated; 3) commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
information about the property; 4) the obviousness of the presence of contamination at
the property; and 5) the ability a party would have to detect the contamination if it used
"appropriate" inspection. ld.
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B. Environmental Law in Germany: What Liability for Buyers of
Former East German Companies?
When compared with the United States, Germany has
comparatively less intricate hazardous waste laws.8' In recent
years, Germany has developed two approaches to environmental
liability.82 First, environmental liability is governed by specific,
limited provisions which protect natural resources, air, water,
and the general environment. 3 Under the second approach,
civil liability provisions of the German Civil Code are used to
enforce environmental regulation.84
Currently there is no law in Germany that specifies single
liability standards for waste and contaminated property like
CERCLA does in the United States.85 However, several different
"1 See G. Nelson Smith III, A Comparative Analysis of European and American Environmental
Laws: Their Effects on International Blue Chip Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, 14 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. RE%. 573, 590-91 (1991) (discussing German hazardous waste law).
European countries generally have less environmental regulation because environmental
liability has only recently become a matter of central concern for these nations. Id. at 589.
" Caroline London & Brizay London, Environmental Liability Under the Laws of EC
Member States, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: U.S./EUROPE 255, 258 (5th Annual ALI-ABA Course of Study,
Sept. 24-26, 1992).
3 Id.
" Id. For example, under Article 906 of the German Civil Code, an installation owner
may be held strictly liable for environmental impairment to another landowner's property.
Id. at 264-65. However, this Article is subject to many restrictions which limit its
importance. The injured landowner does not have a cause of action if the emissions are
either not substantial or are substantial but are the result of "customary" local activity. Id.
Therefore, for example, an owner does not have a cause of action against a neighboring
installation if his property is located in a highly industrialized area. Id.
11 Id. at 258.
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laws join to form a liability structure which has implications for
investors purchasing firms in Germany. 6
1. Federal Waste Disposal Act
In 1972, The Federal Republic of Germany passed the Federal
Waste Disposal Act (the Act).7 Amended in 1986, the Act de-
fines and regulates the authorities responsible for controlling
pollution, and gives the conditions and requirements for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of certain substances and
wastes.88
The Act states that "waste shall be so disposed of that the
welfare of the community shall not be impaired." 9 This lan-
guage is very similar to that in European Community Council
'8 See id. at 265-66 (outlining relevant German law). In addition to the statutes dis-
cussed below, the North Rhine-Westphalia's Police and Administrative Law must be taken
into account. This law holds two types of individuals liable for pollution emanating from
derelict industrial sites or former dump sites. Id. at 266. First, "the person whose dump site
operation has endangered public safety" may be held liable. Id. Second, "a person acting in
his or her capacity as owner or operator" may be held liable "for any danger resulting from
the state of the dump site." Id. In either case, German courts will apply strict, unlimited
liability to the parties held responsible for pollution originating from dump sites. Id. Per-
sons falling into either category will be held strictly liable even where: (1) technical
knowledge which could have indicated the danger was either absent or too limited; (2) the
site operators were not aware of the danger; or (3) state authorities did not properly
supervise the site. Id.
Under this scheme, a purchaser of a polluted site could be held strictly liable for
damages committed by former owners for activities of which the purchaser had no
knowledge. The purchaser may, however, bring an action against the actual polluter to
recover the costs incurred in cleaning up the site. Id. at 266.
" Gesetz uber die Vermeidung und Entsorgung von Abfallen (Abfallgeset-Abfg) vom
27. August 1986, 1986 BGB1. 1 1410, corrected at 1501). See Smith, supra note 81, at 591 n.99
(citing the Act).
" Smith, supra note 81, at 590-91.
89 Id.
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Directive (ECCD) 75/422.90 The government is responsible for
protecting the public from improper disposal of these wastes.9
2. The Environmental Liability Act of 1990
In 1990 Germany enacted a new civil liability law called the
Environmental Liability Act of 1990 (ELA).92 This act presents
9 Directives promulgated by the Economic Community (EC) merely offer principles
intended to give member countries a framework for establishing their own individual envi-
ronmental policies. Id. at 589. However, the Treaty of Rome binds member states to ensure
that EC directives are implemented. Id. (citing F. James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A
Leak In the System of International Legal Controls, 19 ENvrL. L. REP. 10171 (1989)). Each indi-
vidual country has discretion as to which methods it will use to implement these directives.
Id.
One of the primary EC waste directives is the Council of European Communities
Directive on Waste, 75/442/EEC (1975) [hereafter Council Directive 75/442]. Smith, supra
note 81, at 589. Enacted in 1975, it encourages member countries to ensure that waste is
disposed of without injuring humans or the environment. Id. at 590 (citing Council Direc-
tive 75/442 art. 4). However, this directive has a limited impact on hazardous waste due to
explicit exclusions and a limiting definition. This directive excludes:
a) radioactive waste;
b) waste resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment, and storage of min-
eral resources and the working of quarries;
c) animal carcasses and the following agricultural waste: fecal matter and other
substances used in farming;
d) waste waters, with the exception of waste in liquid form;
e) gaseous affluent emitted into the atmosphere;
I) waste covered by specific community rules.
Id. at 590 n.95 (quoting Council Directive 75/442 art. 2, sec. 2).
Council Directive 75/442 defines waste as 'any substance or object which the holder
disposes of or is required to dispose of pursuant to the national law in force." Id. at 588-89
(quoting Council Directive, 75/442, art. 1). In addition, individual member states are al-
lowed to "adopt specific rules for particular categories of waste" and are given individual
power to determine their own precise method of managing waste disposal. Id. at 590-91
(quoting Council Directive 75/442, art. 2).
" The German provision differs from Council Directive 75/442 in that the waste gen-
erator "is required to make the wastes available to the public authority required to dispose
of it." Smith, supra note 81, at 591. Therefore, the local government is often the party that
disposes of these wastes. Id.
Germany requires specific licensing of facilities before they can be used to treat, store,
or deposit particular types and quantities of waste. Id. In addition, individuals who collect
and transport waste products must also be licensed and wastes may not be collected for
transportation until the disposal facility has explicitly certified that it will accept the wastes.
Id. The German federal government reserves the power to issue special decrees requiring
harmful items to be specifically labeled or returned to their manufacturers. Id. Germany
also requires that by-products that are an unavoidable result of certain processes or which
are not reusable be disposed of in special facilities. Id.
- Gesetz uber die Umwelthaftung (Environmental Liability Act), (enacted Nov. 7,
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a single statutory scheme for dealing with damage resulting from
impacts on water, soil, and air." The ELA provides for civil
damages for "wrongful death, personal injury, or property dam-
age caused by an environmental impact."94 Under the ELA, op-
erators of specifically named facilities are strictly liable for waste
emissions which result in injuries. 5 Because of the difficulty
plaintiffs have experienced establishing fault in the past, the
legislature considered it necessary to include a provision provid-
ing for strict liability. 6
The ELA applies to approximately one hundred listed plants,
including those governed by the Pollution Control Act, which
covers chemical manufacturing, paint shops, pharmaceutical
installations, cooling towers, furnaces, and gas turbines. 7 Sec-
tion 1 of the ELA provides that the "owner" of a facility will be
held strictly liable for injuries to anyone resulting from an envi-
ronmental impact emitted from any of the specifically listed
facilities. 8 Causation alone determines liability; no finding of
fault is required.' Polluters are strictly liable regardless of
whether the emission was "intended, negligent, known, un-
1990 and effective as of Jan. 1, 1991); William C. Hoffman, Germany's New Environmental
Liability Act: Strict Liability for Facilities Causing Pollution, 38 NETH. INTL. L. REv. 27, 27 (1991)
(explaining Environmental Liability Act).
' Hoffman, supra note 92, at 27.
I&. Environmental impacts can include damage caused by any substance, vibration,
noise, pressure, radiation, gas, steam or warmth, or any other substance or effect emitted
or discharged into the ground, air, or water. London & London, supra note 82, at 261. "Im-
pact" is interpreted broadly as "a change in the physical, chemical, or biological quality of
water, ground or air." Id. (quoting Landsberg-Lulling, Umwelthaftungsrecht,
Bundesanzeiger Schaeffer Verlag, 1991, at 105). Under the ELA, courts will not consider
damage caused by an installation which has "broken down" to be the result of an environ-
mental impact. Id.
y London & London, supra note 82, at 260; Hoffman, supra note 92, at 32.
London & London, supra note 82, at 260.
97 Id.
"' Hoffman, supra note 92, at 32. Under the ELA, liability attaches as a result of legal
ownership or other rights to the installation, or where a party is found to have economic
control of the installation. London & London, supra note 82, at 260. Under ELA art. I,
liability applies to the possessor or "inhabe?" of a particular installation. Id. Under German
caselaw, an inhaber can be any person who operates an installation for his own account and
assumes all costs relating to maintenance of the facility. Id. Generally, the inhaber is the
plant owner. Id. at 261. German courts will hold the inhaber liable for damage caused by an
"Umwelteinwirkung," or, environmental impact resulting from the plant's operation. Id.
'" Hoffman, supra note 92 at 32.
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known, 'sudden and accidental,' or 'gradual.""'  The ELA also
provides for joint and several liability in cases where multiple
defendants are liable for the injury at issue. 1 In addition, it
has extraterritorial reach so that businesses operating in the
vicinity of Germany could be held liable under its provisions. °2
In order to bring an action under the ELA, a party must
establish three elements: (1) the defendant operates a "facili-
ty,"' (2) an environmental discharge was emitted from the
defendant's facility, and (3) this environmental discharge caused
the damage at issue.'0 4 Even if all of these elements are estab-
lished, ELA liability is subject to several specific exclusions. 5 A
party will not be held liable under the ELA when the emission
results from an act of God, the damage is insubstantial, or the
impairment is "reasonable according to the local conditions."'06
Article 16 of the ELA provides that any party that is liable for
damage to property may also be required to pay to restore the
environment and landscape to its original state. 7 Further-
10o Id.
101 Id.
1o Id. at 38.
103 Under the ELA, a facility is defined as a "permanent structure such as a place of
business or warehouse," and also includes any "machines, instruments, vehicles, and other
mobile technical structures," as well as "outbuildings which stand in a spacial or technical
relation to a facility or part thereof and could be significant for the occurrence of an envi-
ronmental impact." Id. at 33. The ELA also applies to facilities no longer being used and to
facilities which are not finished. Id. ELA Appendix 1 contains a list of ninety-six types of
facilities grouped into ten general categories. This list specifically includes facilities engaged
in the processing, manufacture, or handling of certain materials. Id. The ELA defines an
environmental impact as "material, vibration, noise, pressure, rays, gasses, steam, heat, or
other phenomena which are emitted into soil, air, or water." Id. at 34.
"'o Id. at 33. Causation is the most difficult element to prove under the ELA. Id. at 34-
35. With this difficulty in mind, ELA section 6 creates a presumption of causation. Id. Sec-
tion 6(1) stipulates that causation will be presumed when there is a prima facie showing
that a particular facility is "inherently suited to cause the damage." Id. The defendant bears
the burden of rebutting the causation presumption. Id.
The defendant may rebut the causation presumption by showing that the facility was
"properly operated" or that the facility "fulfilled all 'special operational duties' and that no
disruption of operations occurred." Id. In order to fulfill all special operational duties, the
facility must demonstrate that it fulfilled all "applicable administrative regulator) duties
aimed at preventing pollution." Id. The ELA also includes a "sub-presumption" which can
help a defendant overcome the presumption of causation and allows for specific defenses
to the presumption, thus making it not an entirely insurmountable obstacle for a defen-
dant. Id. at 35-36.
105 Id. at 32.
106 Id.
"' London & London, supra note 82, at 262-63. Where such restoration is required, un-
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more, under- the ELA, operators will not be held liable for "non-
material" or aesthetic damages.
°8
3. The Impact of the ELA on Corporate Environmental
Liability for Buyers of Former East German Companies
For investors in former East Germany, the ELA will not usual-
ly be a concern. Although the ELA applies to the entire territo-
ry of the former East Germany, a law passed on March 22, 1992,
releases investors in the new eastern states from any liability for
environmental damage resulting from waste sites."° The legisla-
ture considered this law necessary to alleviate the fears of po-
tential investors that they would acquire immeasurable environ-
mental liabilities."' Under this provision, investors may apply
for an exemption from liability."" However, the exemption
does not represent a clear guarantee of immunity from environ-
mental liabilities and leaves open a number of difficult ques-
tions."'
First and foremost, the exemption is not automatically issued
by law. The process of getting an exemption from the authori-
ties can be administratively burdensome and time consum-
ing."3 In addition, exemptions are subject to the following re-
strictions: (1) they are available to buyers of "old" plants but
they do not apply to the premises upon which the plant sits; (2)
they only cover damage caused before July 1, 1990, and not
contamination resulting from activities conducted after that date;
and (3) they do not release the buyer once and for all from fu-
der the ELA, the measures may be demanded even where the cost of restoration is dispro-
portionate to the value of the land. Id. The statute of limitations applicable to claims for
damages under the ELA is three years beginning when the injured party acquires knowl-
edge of the damage and the identity of the person responsible, or thirty years after the
occurrence of the damage if there is no such knowledge. Id.
'o Id. at 262.
'o Id. at 263; Bernd Kunth, Environmental Law of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND REGULATION 26-27 (J. Andrew Schlickman et al. eds., 1992).
"o London & London, supra note 82, at 263.
Id.
n Kunth, supra note 109, at 26-27; see also Gruson & Thoma, supra note 4, at 478
nn.100-02 (explaining that exemption does not fully cover environmental liabilities under
private law to third parties).
"' Kunth, supra note 109, at 26-27.
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ture liabilities for an environmental cleanup."4 An environ-
mental cleanup fund will be created in the future and private
investor contributions to this fund have not yet been deter-
mined."5
In former West Germany, the ELA's impact on corporate
successor liability appears to be limited. On the one hand, it
creates joint and several liability for corporate successors where
an ongoing violation is occurring. This could cause corporate
successors to be liable for the misdeeds of their predecessor
corporations. On the other hand, it applies only prospectively: it
excludes pollution occurring before the Act's effective date. This
eliminates a successor corporation's potential liability for most
environmental problems.
In addition, potential purchasers have limited liability for
environmental problems. The Act limits the potential amount of
liability for each case to DM 320 million."' This cap allows a
successor corporation to at least calculate a worst case scenario
for the potential environmental liabilities associated with an
acquisition.
C. Liability Regimes That Promote Certainty Increase
Auction Revenues
Does either the American model or the German model
provide a good alternative for Polish policymakers? From the
point of view of maximizing auction revenues, the American
CERCLA system has serious problems. CERCLA's strict liability
fixes all cleanup responsibility for environmental contamination
on the winning bidder in the auction. If bidders are provided
with an accurate and in-depth environmental audit before
bidding, then they will have a solid basis for estimating their
liability for known on-site pollution. Yet, even the best audit
could fail to uncover all on-site contamination or to establish
the level of pollution that migrated from the site to other sites.
If the new owners know they will be strictly liable for cleaning
114 Id.
115 Id.
..6 Hoffman, supra note 92, at 32-33. Under German law, compensation paid by an
operator for death or bodily injury may not exceed DM 160 million. London & London,
supra note 82, at 262.
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up these further spills, but are unable to determine the extent
of this future liability, they will reduce their bids by more than
the expected value of this future liability."7 Finally, CERCLA's
innocent purchaser defense reduces, but does not eliminate, this
uncertainty for many properties."8 The defense is not available
to purchasers who knowingly buy contaminated properties.
Even for those purchasers who believe that their new
properties are pollution-free, the validity of a successor
company's innocent purchaser defense can only be established
after it has purchased the predecessor company and after an
environmental cleanup problem has been uncovered."9 When
an unsafe environmental condition is found, courts may be
tempted in hindsight to find that a successor company failed to
exercise due care and should be liable for cleaning up any waste
problem. This leaves purchasers uncertain about the extent of
their potential environmental liabilities.
CERCLA's strict liability even lacks a sound policy justification
when applied to the privatization in Poland. Proponents of
CERCLA's strict liability regime claim it provides a conduit for
funneling liability for past environmental contamination to the
private companies responsible for the contamination by forcing
successor companies to take future cleanup costs into account in
making their bids.' Thus, the negative externalities of
production are internalized by having the actual polluter bear
these costs.
In the case of Poland, all of the actual polluters were state-
owned industries. Even if strict liability worked perfectly in
forcing private investors to value these pollution costs and
reduce their bids by exactly the correct amount, and as noted
above it would not, a much simpler means of transferring this
liability to the state exists. Poland could simply agree that pri-
vate investors would assume no cleanup liability for past
"7 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (explaining that uncertainty over extent
of environmental liability will decrease auction revenues disproportionately).
"' See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing innocent purchaser de-
fense).
I' See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing innocent purchaser de-
fense).
" See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that buyers discount auction bids
to account for uncertain environmental cleanup liability).
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pollution levels and the state could shoulder the entire burden
of this cleanup.
Germany has adopted an approach somewhat like this for
investors in the former East German companies. Under German
law, investors in the new eastern states can obtain significant
relief from environmental risks if they are granted a liability
waiver by the proper authorities. 2' If such waivers were
automatically granted to new investors, releasing them from all
liability for environmental cleanup, this system would eliminate
investor uncertainty about their future environmental liabilities.
In practice, the German system does not extend this far.
These liability exemptions can only be obtained after a long and
burdensome administrative process, and are subject to several
limitations. The most significant of these limitations is that inves-
tors are not permanently released from future liability. Instead,
they are told they will have to pay an as yet undetermined
amount into a cleanup fund in the future.'12 The amount of
this potential liability is presumably capped at the same DM 320
million level that exists for purchasers of West German
companies. Thus, if Poland adopted the existing German system,
potential purchasers of Polish companies would still face
significant and uncertain levels of environmental cleanup costs.
Yet, even if the German model provided a complete
environmental liability exemption for past pollution, it would
not be a suitable system for Poland. First, the Polish government
has little information about pollution levels beyond what it
obtains in the superficial initial environmental audits. All other
information is generated by the purchasers themselves through
their own environmental studies. The government has extremely
limited capacity to check the accuracy of these private studies.
Bidders can minimize their current expenditures on
environmental cleanup by understating the size of the problems
with little fear of getting caught because they know there is no
effective governmental monitoring. However, under the current
system, understating these liabilities today may simply defer the
12 See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (summarizing law of German liability
waivers).
22 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing liability exemption limita-
tions).
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cleanup expenses until later when the property is sold or more
effective governmental environmental testing measures are
instituted. In the end, the investors will bear these costs.
If potential bidders know they will have no cleanup liabilities
for past contamination, they will have strong incentives to
overestimate the scope of the current environmental problems.
These new owners may say that their industries had generated
massive amounts of contamination in the past, and thereby
overstate baseline pollution levels. This will reduce their
potential burden for pollution that is created after they take
over the business. If after several years they sell the business and
the new buyers conduct an environmental audit as part of the
sale, or the government creates a well-functioning monitoring
system, their cleanup costs will be minimized.
The second problem with releasing investors from liability for
environmental cleanup costs is the difficulty Poland would have
financing cleanups. Suppose that an auction of a company is
conducted, and that the Polish government institutes an
environmental auditing system that establishes the scope and
cost of cleaning up the company's existing environmental
problems. Assume that investors know that they have no
responsibility for cleanup, and therefore their bids for the
company are increased by the net amount of the cleanup costs
they would have incurred. If all of these assumptions hold, at
the conclusion of the auction, the Polish government should be
able to take the additional monies it receives in the auction and
use them to finance its own cleanup program. Ideally, Poland
could use these monies to target cleanup of areas of the
greatest risk to human health and the environment.12 3
Politics and a weak governmental administrative structure
make it unlikely this kind of targeting would occur. Faced with
declining output, rising inflation, and increasing unemployment,
the pressure on the Polish government to divert these funds to
other high priority uses may prove irresistible. Even if these
pressures could be overcome, the internal structure of the
government would need to be drastically strengthened for it to
.2 See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 1, at 967-68 n.215 (suggesting that Poland focus
on spending its limited resources in cleaning up highest risk properties first, rather than
spending these funds according to which properties are privatized first).
University of Cal fornia, Davis
be capable of supervising a massive environmental cleanup
program. 24 Instead, Polish policy should be directed toward
keeping both the private and public sectors involved in resolving
environmental cleanup problems, while at the same time
reducing the pervasive uncertainties that surround the problem
today.
V. DEVELOPING A HYBRID POLICY THAT MAXIMIZES AUCTION
PROCEEDS AND PROVIDES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
Both of the environmental liability regimes analyzed above
have negative aspects to them. A better approach for Poland
would be to adopt a hybrid policy whereby private investors are
responsible for environmental cleanup costs up to a negotiated,
but fixed, level. For costs above that amount, the Polish govern-
ment would need to obtain revenues from other sources to
finance the cleanup. This system could be implemented quickly
and would provide for an immediate cleanup of existing pollu-
tion problems.
The regulatory system for handling environmental liabilities of
privatized companies could operate as follows. Before commenc-
ing an auction, the Polish government would use a reputable
third party to conduct an environmental audit. This audit would
calculate the expected cost of cleaning up (at the appropriate
technological level) the existing contamination on the property.
This environmental audit might be financed by a developed
country aid agency as part of a program to encourage invest-
ment by its private sector in Poland.'25
Bidders would be advised of the estimated cleanup costs, and
of the amount of their contribution toward this cleanup. As a
policy matter, the Polish government might decide that it would
bear a portion of these costs itself to encourage investors to buy
Polish companies. The amount, if any, the government would
pay could be varied by negotiation.'26
"' See Smith, supra note 2, at 573-74 (stating, " . . . even if it did possess the time and
money, Poland lacks the necessary expertise to ensure an effective remediation" of existing
environmental waste sites).
125 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing how aid agencies can finance
audits).
12 See Berz & Connolly, supra note 2, at 4 (recommending that all former Soviet-bloc
[Vol. 28:165
1994] The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on Privatization 203
From the investors' point of view, this revision of Polish policy
would be advantageous. Private investors' environmental liability
would be capped at the agreed amount. From the private
investor's perspective, this eliminates the environmental cleanup
cost uncertainties from its calculations of the company's value.
The proposed policy would also raise the prices received in
privatization auctions by reducing bidder uncertainty.'27 As not-
ed above, reducing bidder uncertainty maximizes auction reve-
nues by narrowing the range of bidders' estimates of the value
of a company and squeezing bidder profits. 8 While adopting
the German model could accomplish the same objective of mini-
mizing uncertainty, it places too much responsibility on the
Polish government to insure that the additional auction revenues
are spent on environmental cleanup activities and not diverted
to other pressing needs.
The policy would stimulate an immediate cleanup of the worst
environmental waste sites. Ideally, the Polish government could
press the winning bidders to begin cleaning up the worst and
most dangerous hazardous waste sites immediately. An escrow
system could be used for the monies dedicated to cleanup,
whereby the new owners would have to initiate cleanup activities
within a short time period or forfeit the money to the govern-
ment while still retaining responsibility for the cleanup. This
would reduce the Polish government's involvement in the clean-
up process and reduce the administrative problems of bringing
about the cleanup.
Once the investors knew how much cleaning up they needed
to do, they would have strong incentives to engage in the most
cost-effective pollution remediation programs possible. The Pol-
countries conduct routine environmental audits to identify potential environmental liabili-
ties and that these liabilities should be addressed in purchase agreements). But see id. at 4
(noting that these negotiations would only serve to reduce, not eliminate, investors' poten-
tial liability so that "investors [could] buy into these developing markets with some degree
of protection, at least with respect to pre-existing problems."). Addressing assessed environ-
mental liabilities in purchase agreements would probably not eliminate the impact of inves-
tor uncertainty on auction revenues, however. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text
(discussing impact of uncertainty on auction revenues).
127 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (describing impact of uncertainty on
auction revenues).
" See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing how reducing range of
bidders' value estimates leads to lower bidder profits in auctions).
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ish government would also know its financial responsibilities for
cleanup activities.
Furthermore, the proposed policy would help clarify Polish
environmental policy in several ways. Environmental audits
would generate reliable information about the existing contami-
nation levels at the companies that are being privatized. Any
coherent environmental policy must begin by establishing the
extent of the existing problems so that priority sites can be
identified.
Second, reforms along the lines suggested would clarify the
environmental policy choices that need to be made by the Pol-
ish government. In particular, hard choices need to be made
about the appropriate level of cleanup activities to be undertak-
en. These costs may be prohibitive, in which case Poland could
decide to engage in a lower cost containment policy. Further-
more, the trade-offs between encouraging more private in-
vestment and generating a higher level of environmental clean-
up would be made explicit through the Polish government's
willingness to negotiate reductions in cleanup costs in return for
greater levels of private investment.
The Polish government would also be free to vary the amount
of environmental cleanup costs that it assessed bidders for se-
lected companies. For example, some Polish companies may be
"negative asset enterprises," that is, companies whose assessed
environmental liabilities exceed their expected purchase prices,
even though they are viable businesses." 9 If the Ministry of Pri-
vatization wants to nurture these businesses and create employ-
ment possibilities for workers, it could choose to stretch out
investors' financing of the expense of environmental liability
over time to encourage them to purchase such businesses.'
' See Bell & Kolaja, supra note 1, at 958 (defining negative asset enterprise as one
where environmental liability exceeds expected purchase price).
I' See id. (stating that Polish government will nurture business and spread out environ-
mental costs for purchasers).
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VI. HOW TO HANDLE FUTURE DEMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE?
Not all existing pollution may be discovered by even the best
environmental audits, not to mention audits that are hastily con-
ducted, or overly limited in their scope. If the Polish govern-
ment adopts the proposed legal regime, it will have released the
new private investors from any obligation to pay for the cleanup
of these undiscovered wastes.
How can the Polish government finance the cleanup of exist-
ing pollution that is not uncovered in the environmental audit
process? The German regime leaves open the possibility that
private investors will have to make future payments into a clean-
up fund. 3' The amounts of these payments have yet to be de-
termined by the German government, but presumably they will
relate to the size of the cleanup costs incurred by the govern-
ment. However, the amount of this liability is uncertain, which
reintroduces the same forms of uncertainty in the auction pro-
cess that were discussed earlier.
31
One solution to this problem is to require winning bidders to
cover these excess environmental liabilities up to a certain fixed
amount. Winning bidders could buy environmental liability in-
surance (ELI), or self-insure if they conclude that they are bet-
ter off doing so. The Polish government could add this require-
ment for winning bidders without creating serious bidder uncer-
tainty (and disproportionately reducing auction revenues) so
long as the cost of this insurance is fixed at a predetermined
level.
The key to implementing this system would be developing a
commercially viable ELI scheme in Poland. At present, no ELI
policies are available there. The last two parts of this Article
explore what entity would be best suited to run such a scheme
and whether it would work.
"' See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting German law provision for creating
environmental cleanup find).
"' See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (describing effect of uncertainty on
auction revenues).
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A. The Key Features of an Effective Environmental Liability
Insurance Program
Even the largest companies buy liability insurance to protect
themselves against certain types of environmental claims. This
environmental liability insurance must perform several functions:
(1) transfer risk from parties who are comparatively risk-averse
to insurers who are relatively more willing to bear risk; (2)
spread risks by combining individual uncorrelated risks in a pool
created by the insurer so that the insurer can diversify its own
risk and operate a risk-sharing arrangement; and (3) perform a
risk allocation function by charging premiums that reflect the
level of risk posed by each enterprise that is insured.' Envi-
ronmental liability insurance will perform these functions well
only where uncertainty about the scope of the risks to be
insured is neither complete (in which case the insurance is
simply a gamble) nor zero (in which case there is no need for
the insurance).
An insurer must be able to quantify the impact of existing
liability rules on its insureds and anticipate potential changes in
those rules.M In the case of Poland, the ELI policy proposed
would be limited in its scope to the risks associated with
cleaning up existing but unidentified pollution and the excess
cleanup costs for identified pollution. Insurers will need to be
able to predict the average of these costs for a large group of
companies with some accuracy in order to write these policies.
The insurer may also bear the risk that the government will
strengthen environmental liability rules in the future, thereby in-
creasing excess cleanup costs.
For insurers to predict the costs of cleaning up existing but
unidentified pollution and excess cleanup costs for identified
pollution, they will need to have solid data on existing levels of
pollution and some ability to monitor production of new pollu-
tion. One way they could obtain such information is by helping
to finance the environmental site assessment studies that are be-
ing prepared prior to the auction of the companies.
Participation in the environmental auditing process would give
... Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 942, 945-46 (1988).
'" Id. at 955.
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them the most accurate information available for establishing a
pollution baseline." 5  Furthermore, buyers would need to
accept the insurers' monitoring of their operations as a
condition of renewal of their environmental liability insurance.
Thus, insurers will have the information they need to assess
these risks.
The risk of a change in Polish environmental law is a much
harder risk for the insurer to predict. The Polish government
can minimize this risk for each privatized company by binding
itself, to fixed cleanup standards that define what pollution is
and what adequate cleanup standards are." This would reduce
the insurable risk to the risk of a change of government where
the new government does not honor the previous government's
commitments. From the insurers' perspective, they can insure
against this risk by: (1) selling policies in several countries and
thereby spreading the risk of a change of government over a
larger pool of policies; and (2) inserting cross default
provisions'" in their insurance policies with other contracts
that the new governments are unlikely to allow to default, such
as, World Bank or International Monetary Fund loans.
Multinational aid agencies could adopt both of these measures
more easily than other types of insurers.
If insurers can calculate all of these risks well enough to write
these policies, we can identify the general features of an
appropriate environmental liability insurance system in Poland.
To begin with, it is useful to look at how these policies are
currently written. Many companies currently underwrite
environmental liability insurance policies in the United
States.ss The two basic types of American environmental lia-
" As a condition of the sale, buyers could be required to accept the site assessment's
evaluation of existing pollution. If the buyer believes that the levels found by the site
assessment team are inaccurate, the Polish government could give the buyers a chance to
submit' additional information about existing pollution to the insurer prior to the
finalization of the site assessment report.
" See Nash, supra note 54, at 492 n.261 (discussing difficulties insurers face when
estimating environmental risks). This is a difficult task even in countries where modem
environmental cleanup technologies are widely available; administrative changes in cleanup
technology requirements make it very difficult for insurers to predict future risks. Id.
"' For example, cross default provisions in two contracts might specify that if a default
occurs on the first contract, then the second contract is also considered to be in default.
"' See generally, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAWv: AN
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bility insurance policies are Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) policies, and Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL)
policies."19
Liability insurance policies contain either "claims-made"
coverage or occurrence-type coverage (also called accident-based
coverage). Historically, Comprehensive General Liability (CGL)
insurance policies were occurrence policies, 4' although in
recent years they have become claims-made policies. 4'
ANALYSIS OF Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES (1991)
(discussing environmental liability insurance law and practice in United States); Bruce
Howard & Mark Harrigian, Environmental Due Diligence: Recent Developments in the Process,
Databases, and Insurance, in ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS: EVALUATING AND RESPONDING TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 203 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 761,
1992) available in WESTLAW, 761 PLI/Corp. 203. (examining recent developments in U.S.
environmental liability insurance market).
1"9 Michael L. Rodburg, Case Management and Other Pretrial Considerations: The Insured's
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS AND LITIGATION 1994 523 (PLI
Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 690, 1991), available in WESTLAW, 690
PLI/Comm. 523, at *4, 6. Several other types of policies, such as Commercial Property
Insurance and Pollution Liability policies, can also cover environmental liabilities. However,
for the purposes of this paper, the two types of policies discussed contain the basic features
that need to be examined. For further discussion of these policies, see ABRAHAM, supra
note 138, at 96-72 (explaining CGL and EIL policies).
"4 ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 23-24; Turner T. Smith, Jr., Environmental Damage
Liability Insurance - A Primer, 39 Bus. LAw. 333, 341 (1983).
... Howard & Harrigian, supra note 138, at 223; Rodburg, supra note 139, at 4. Before
1966, environmental liability insurance policies were accident-based, meaning that they
provided broad coverage for personal injury and property damage caused by accidents. Id.
Starting in 1966, policies became occurrence-based. Id. Policies generally defined an
occurrence as an "accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results,
during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id.
In the early 1970's, insurance companies introduced a "pollution exclusion clause"
under which insurance would no longer apply "to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalides, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials, or irritants, contaminants, or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere, or any water course or body of water, but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden and
accidental." Id. In 1982, companies changed the "pollution exclusion" clause so that the
new clause would exclude coverage for releases which were sudden and accidental,
unexpected or unattended. Id. At this time, "claims-based" environmental liability insurance
arose. Id.
Occurrence-based CGL's currently continue to exist, however, and are the subject of
extensive litigation. See generally Thomas C. Gilchrist, Insurance Coverage for Pollution Liability
-in the United States and the United Kingdom: Covering Troubled Waters, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 109 (1991) (comparing pollution liability insurance approaches in U.S. and Great
Britain and noting greater volume of litigation in U.S.).
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Occurrence policies provide "coverage against liability arising out
of injury or damage that occurs during the policy period,
regardless of when a claim alleging such liability is actually
lodged against the insured."'42 Claims-made policies require
that the claimholder discover and make the claim within the
term of the policy. 4 Some policies are triggered only when
the government brings an action against the insured, while
other policies simply require that the named insured or other
insureds discover the environmental damage during the term of
the policy. 4
Most American policies only cover costs associated with
unknown prior conditions. Therefore, these policies do not
cover claims resulting from known existing conditions. Some
policies also cover "new contamination" that occurs after the
policy is put in place.'45 All CGL policies sold today require
that an engineering firm approved by the insurance company
perform a pre-acquisition site assessment.'46 Any contamination
discovered in this environmental audit is not covered by the
policy.
Premiums on current American CGL policies range from
$20,000 to $25,000 per year.'47 Most policies have limits rang-
ing from $10,000,000 to $15,000,000 and deductibles range from
$10,000 to $25,000 per discovery of contamination.'48
Most CGL policies do not cover loss caused by pollution
conditions which existed before the inception of the policy if
any officer or employee-of the insured company responsible for
environmental control or compliance knew or could have
reasonably foreseen that the pollution conditions could have
caused such a claim. 4 ' Most such policies also exclude
coverage for fines, penalties, bodily injury, and property
142 ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 23. The length of the coverage period with occurrence
policies gives rise to "long-tail" liability, that is, liability imposed many years after the injury
or damage that results in liability occurs. Id. These long-tail liabilities have been the source
of much litigation in the U.S. Id.
4. Howard & Harrigian, supra note 138, at 223.
144 J&d
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
14') Id.
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damage."' CGL policies generally will pay the lesser of: (1) the
difference between the appraised value of the property if it were
"clean" and the value of the property when it is contaminated;
(2) costs of cleanup; or (3) policy limits. 5 '
In the late 1970s, American insurance companies developed
Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) policies to cover
gradual pollution events excluded by CGL policies with pollution
exclusion clauses. 52  Most EIL policies contain claims-made
triggers for their coverage. 53 Such policies typically cover on
and off-site property damage, bodily injury, and other loss
caused by "environmental impairment."'54 These policies define
"environmental impairment" to include virtually any release of
any contaminant. 5
However, these policies were readily available only until the
mid-1980s. Today they are hard to find, prohibitively expensive,
or offer only very limited coverage in the United States. 56 The
present market for EIL coverage is very limited. 157 Similarly,
the availability of environmental liability insurance under CGL
policies has contracted severely in recent years. We need to
examine the reasons for the disappearance of ELI policies in
the United States to insure a similar situation does not develop
in Poland.
The American environmental liability insurance market has
been plagued by three main problems: adverse selection, moral
hazard, and generalized uncertainty. Adverse selection is the
tendency for large numbers of higher risk applicants to seek
ISO Id. Some policies also exclude defense costs, defined as "those costs incurred in an
action brought by a third party against the insured." Id. at 224.
151 Id. These policies may also cover "first and third parties." Id. First parties include
property owners; third parties include adjacent property owners' claims where the insured
causes contamination to a third party's property. l
112 Rodburg, supra note 139, at 6.
ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 24.
Rodburg, supra note 139, at 6.
' ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 25. EIL policies (1) apply to directors, officers, and
employees acting within the scope of their employment; (2) do not cover claims for long-
term discharges, long release times, or long latency periods; and (3) often exclude use of
waste facilities on or off-site, or owned waste facilities. Rodburg, supra note 139, at 6.
' Rodburg, supra note 139, at 6.
m Id. When an individual desires to purchase a policy, the insurance agent will mix
and match several different policies in order to create the coverage the entity desires.
Howard & Harrigian, supra note 138, at 223.
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coverage, driving low-risk policyholders to drop out of the pool,
and leading the cost of coverage to rise.'58 Environmental
liability insurance policies typically exclude certain classes of
higher risk businesses to reduce this problem.
For Polish companies that are being privatized, the adverse
selection problem could be minimized by forcing all purchasers
to buy the insurance as a condition of sale. Also, if the
insurance company is also conducting the initial environmental
audits, then it will have the best information about the level of
the risks posed and can price its policies to charge the higher
risk businesses accordingly. However, some companies would
undoubtedly prefer to self-insure and could probably do so at a
lower cost. For these companies, being forced to buy ELI would
impose an additional cost and reduce their bids in the auction.
These costs would need to be balanced against the effects of the
adverse selection problem to determine which policy was
preferable.
Moral hazard arises out of the tendency of insured parties to
use "less care to avoid insured losses than that party would exer-
cise if the losses were uninsured."'59 If the insurer is unable to
obtain information about changes in the" risks posed by insureds
after they obtain coverage, this reduces the insured's incentives
to avoid losses. Here again, insurers usually provide for exclu-
sions and conditions in environmental liability policies to fight
moral hazard problems.
In the Polish context, an insured's ongoing level of care
should not affect the insurance company's liability for the
cleanup of existing pollution except in -one limited circumstance.
This exception could arise if after the new owners take over the
business, they generate new pollution and subsequently claim
that it was pre-existing unidentified pollution. While the Polish
government lacks the incentives and resources to effectively
police this type of abuse, private insurers have better incentives
to act as monitors of ongoing pollution emissions. In the event
they uncover abuses, they could cancel their coverage.
Nevertheless, even if the insurers are diligent monitors, it seems
' ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 21-22.
'5 Id. at 21.
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likely that some abuses will occur and go undetected. This is a
second likely source of losses for insurers in this area.
The most severe problem in the American environmental
liability insurance market has been excessive uncertainty about
the frequency and severity of environmental losses that will be
suffered. Excessive uncertainty causes problems for insurers
because they cannot accurately estimate their probable success in
diversifying risks through pooling, nor can they accurately
determine the correct price to charge for their risk-bearing
services."'s In the United States, CERCLA and other statutory
environmental liabilities may have created excessive uncertainty
in the environmental insurance market.
This problem can be limited if Poland accepts the limited
liability regime proposed in this article. The only risks that ELI
would cover are cleanup costs in excess of those estimated in
the initial environmental audit and the costs of cleaning up
existing but undiscovered pollution. If the insurer conducts the
initial audit, it can minimize both these risks with accurate cost
estimates and careful studies. Poland must avoid creating other
forms of liability for past pollution that would make these liabil-
ities more difficult for insurers to predict.' 6'
In summary, the problems that have plagued the American
environmental liability insurance market cannot be entirely
avoided in Poland, even if that country chooses to adopt policies
consistent 'with those proposed in this Article. It seems likely
that ELI insurers will suffer from adverse selection and moral
hazard problems similar to those that American insurers are
currently experiencing. Given the fragility of the American ELI
market, it remains to be seen whether any entity would offer the
insurance policies needed to implement the program proposed
for Poland.
0 Abraham, supra note 133, at 942, 955-56.
' I ld. at 957-58. For example, unanticipated retroactive strict liability can adversely
affect insurers by making it difficult to assess the risks that are being insured against and by
undermining insurers' confidence that they can predict the future legal regime. Id.
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B. Implementing ELI in Poland: The Need for Multinational Aid
Agency Involvement
In Poland, environmental liability insurance could be
underwritten by three different types of entities: private sector
insurers, the Polish government itself, or multinational aid
agencies. Which one of these groups is'the best candidate to
issue the needed insurance?
At the present, there is no private insurance industry in
Poland that would be capable of writing environmental liability
insurance. Developing a'private sector in Poland will take many
years, and a lot of capital, before private insurance can be a po-
tential solution. In fact, the American experience suggests that
even the existence of such preconditions for a successful insur-
ance industry does not mean it would be willing to provide this
type of insurance.
A second alternative is that the Polish government could
accept this role. There are several disadvantages to this route.
First, the Polish government would be insuring only privatized
companies in Poland, a relatively small pool of companies over
which to spread the insurable risks. Second, the Polish gov-
ernment lacks the money to finance the initial environmental
audits, and the administrative and technical structure needed to
run an insurance program. Finally, the existing Polish
government cannot credibly insure against the risk of a change
of its environmental liability standards caused by a change of
government. Only an outside third party, such as an
international aid agency, could offer such insurance.
International aid agencies are the logical choice to act as
insurers to underwrite environmental liability insurance policies
in Poland. These agencies could create regional insurance
organizations that would spread the insurable risks of excess
cleanup costs, and the less insurable risks of change of liability
regimes, 1 2 over all of the CEE countries. Furthermore, by
acting as a primary insurer in these markets, these aid agencies
could slowly develop a reinsurance market by selling some of
62 Furthermore, the regional insurance agencies could insert cross default provisions
into their loans that would prohibit individual countries from making opportunistic
changes in their environmental laws. This would minimize the likelihood of individual
countries increasing the level of uninsurable uncertainty about environmental liabilities.
University of California, Davis
their liabilities in a secondary market to private insurance
companies that would otherwise refuse to get involved in these
countries."'
International aid agencies have several other advantages over
other parties as insurers. First, they have the funds to finance
the initial environmental audits needed to facilitate the smooth
functioning of an insurance scheme and to increase auction
revenues from the ongoing privatization efforts. These audits
would also provide insurers with the information that they need
to underwrite these risks. Second, nost international aid
agencies have administrative personnel with experience running
large technical organizations. While these personnel may not be
experienced in insurance issues, they could easily subcontract for
the necessary skilled personnel to run such a regional insurance
program. Third, many of these international aid agencies have
the financial resources necessary to undertake this project. Any
group that takes on the task of creating an insurance market
where none has existed before would need substantial financial
resources to support the environmental audits needed and to
have credibility in the insurance market.
At least three major multinational aid agencies are currently
positioned to finance environmental liability insurance programs
in the Central and Eastern European countries: the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
World Bank. The EBRD's mandate is to promote private
initiative and democracy in countries converting to market-based
economies."6 It has over $12 billion of financial capital to
invest in Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet
Union. 65 Additionally, the EBRD has an environmental policy
requiring projects considered by the Bank to be evaluated in
terms of their environmental impact." This could be extended
"' In this sense, the regional insurance organizations would be acting to give their
insureds indirect access to the commercial insurance markets. See ABRAHAM, supra note 138,
at 17-18 (discussing alternative methods of risk spreading in insurance industry).
" See European Bank Is a Potential Source of Procurement Opportunities for U.S. Firms,
BUSINESS AMERICA, July 13, 1992, at 22 (discussing EBRD's investment priorities and role in
economic development in CEE nations).
165 Id.
' Chris A. Wold & Durwood Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable Development and Democracy in
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to cover the financing of environmental audits and the develop-
ment of ELI programs.
USAID has a broader global focus, with regional bureaus in
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Near
East.'67 Its budget includes nearly $6.5 billion per year for all
of its programs, with over half of these monies earmarked for
developing countries." USAID has recently shifted its policy
towards consideration of environmental issues, and each of its
regional bureaus has adopted an environmental strategy." If
some portion of USAID's massive resources could be redirected
toward financing environmental audits and supporting ELI
programs, it would go a long way toward enacting the types of
reforms envisioned in this Article.
The World Bank, comprised of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliates,
committed over $21.7 billion in 1992 to projects and disbursed
over $16.3 billion.7 The Bank aims "to help raise standards of
living in developing countries by channeling financial resources
to them from developed countries," and is committed to
addressing environmental waste problems because "liability for
past environmental damage" creates uncertainty for potential
investors. 17' Thus, the World Bank has stated that there is "an
urgent need to establish [environmental] priorities" in Central
and Eastern Europe. 72 As with the other donors discussed, the
potential for World Bank financing of Polish environmental
audits and ELI programs is good.
Yet, even assuming that the multinational aid agencies rise to
the challenge of financing environmental audits and providing
ELI, the American and Western European experience with ELI
suggests that these insurance schemes are not likely to break
even financially. Instead, by providing this insurance at a loss,
Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 7
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 567-68 (1992).
167 Susan Holly, Focus on the Environment, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Dec.
7, 1992, at 872.
" Gary M. Ernsdorff, The Agency for International Development and NEPA: A Duty Unful-
filled, 67 WASH. L. REX'. 133, 135 (1992).
Holly, supra note 167, at 872.
'7 WORLD BANK, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1993).
'~' Id. at 17, 139.
17 Id. at 139.
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international donors may be simply creating a covert subsidy for
privatization through the stabilization of the insurance market.
This suggests that international donors should proceed initially
with an ELI scheme on a pilot project basis until they can
determine the real costs and benefits of this form of aid.
What is the effect on Poland if no viable ELI scheme can be
put into place and it has released the private investors from
responsibility for the cleanup of existing but unknown pollution?
In this worst case scenario, Poland may have to self-finance the
cleanup of these hazardous wastes through higher taxes on
future incomes or by diverting government spending from other
areas in the future. However, at least it will have encouraged
immediate private investment in its economy that can create new
jobs and raise current income levels, while at the same time
insuring that some environmental cleanup occurs promptly.
Given the difficult policy choices that Poland faces, that may be
the best that it can do at present.
CONCLUSION
Privatization in Poland and the other CEE nations is proceed-
ing slowly with potentially large and uncertain environmental
liabilities surrounding many of the companies that are being
sold to the private sector. Investors need assurances that they
will not face catastrophic future environmental liabilities before
they will make major investments in private industry in these
nations. On the other hand, Poland and the other CEE govern-
ments want to increase state revenues from the sale of these
companies and produce funds for environmental cleanup.
Auction theory shows that these countries can achieve the
results they want and yet induce private investment by adopting
an environmental policy that: (1) requires a thorough environ-
mental audit to determine the costs of cleaning up existing
pollution; and (2) makes investors bear a fixed amount of these
cleanup costs, while the national government is responsible for
the remainder of the cleanup. This policy allows the state to
negotiate flexibly over what portion of the cleanup costs it will
assess against a purchaser and what portion it will absorb itself.
This policy could be criticized for not providing funds to
cleanup existing but unknown pollution that is not uncovered in
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the environmental audits. One possible solution to this problem
is to require winning bidders to buy ELI insurance for a fixed
price. If the ELI approach is adopted, multinational aid agencies
could act as underwriters for the environmental liability insur-
ance and help finance the initial environmental audits. Aid
agencies are the natural candidates for this role because they
can form regional insurance agencies that would spread these
risks over a large pool of companies from different countries.
Furthermore, this new role for aid agencies offers them a
unique opportunity to encourage economic development, while
also facilitating environmental cleanup.
However, the fragility of the ELI markets in America suggests
that such markets in Poland are unlikely to be profitable. Before
the international aid community makes a substantial resource
commitment to subsidization of this type of insurance, it should
first determine its costs and benefits through pilot projects.

